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 ABSTRACT	  	  This	   article	   explores	   Darwall’s	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	   morality,	   which	   draws	   on	  Fichte’s	  practical	  philosophy,	  particularly	  Fichte’s	  notions	  of	  a	  summons	  and	  principle	  of	  right.	  Darwall	  maintains	  that	  Fichte	  offers	  a	  philosophically	  more	  appealing	  account	  of	  relations	  of	  right	  than	  Kant.	  Likewise,	  he	  thinks	  that	  his	  second-­‐personal	  interpretation	  of	  morality	  gives	  rise	  to	  contractualism.	  I	  reject	  Darwall’s	  criticism	  of	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  right.	  Moreover,	  I	  try	  to	  show	  that	  Darwall’s	  second-­‐personal	  conception	  of	  morality	  relies	   on	   a	   Kantian	   form	   of	   contractualism.	   Instead	   of	   accepting	   Darwall’s	   claim	   that	  contractualism	  depends	  upon	   a	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	  morality,	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  contractualism	  provides	   the	   foundations	  not	  only	   for	   second-­‐personal	  moral	   relations,	  but	  also	  for	  first-­‐personal	  moral	  authority.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  The	  basic	   idea	   of	   contractualism	   is	   that	  moral	   principles	   are	   justified	  by	   a	   reasonable	  agreement	   between	   equals	   entertaining	   cooperative	   relations	   with	   one	   another.1	  Accordingly,	   actions	   are	   right	   or	   wrong	   depending	   upon	   whether	   they	   comply	   with	  principles	  which	  everyone	  could	  reasonably	  accept,	  or,	  rather,	  which	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	   rejected.	   Contractualism	   is	   commonly	   associated	   with	   a	   relational	   conception	   of	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  Thanks	  to	  Fabienne	  Peter	  for	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  written	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  on	  an	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  version	  of	  the	  paper.	  I	  also	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  Baiasu	  for	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  discussion.	  Research	  for	  this	  paper	  was	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  by	  the	  ERC	  Advanced	  Research	  Grant	  “Distortions	  of	  Normativity”.	  	  1	  Note	  that	  I	  adopt	  the	  familiar	  distinction	  between	  contractarianism	  and	  contractualism.	  Contractarianism	  considers	  an	  agreement	  on	  moral	  principles	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  compromises	  by	  rational	  egoists	  who	  are	  eager	  to	  avoid	  suboptimal	  outcomes	  generated	  by	  their	  individual	  maximizing	  strategies.	  Contractualism	  assumes	  that	  agreement	  on	  moral	  principles	  is	  based	  on	  considerations	  that	  are	  acceptable	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  all;	  no	  one	  can	  reasonably	  reject	  those	  principles.	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morality.	   A	   key	   element	   is	   recognizing	   the	   rightful	   claims	   others	   have	   on	   us	   and	   our	  accountability	  to	  them	  for	  our	  actions	  and	  practices.	  	  	  In	  his	  book	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  (2006),	  Stephen	  Darwall	  endorses	  such	  a	  form	  of	  contractualism.	  His	  argument	  is	  that	  a	  second-­‐personal	  theory	  of	  morality	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  version	  of	  contractualism	  that	   involves	  Kant’s	  requirements	  of	  universality	  and	  of	  treating	  others	  as	  ends.	  A	  striking	  feature	  of	  Darwall’s	  account	  of	  morality	  is	  its	  reliance	  on	   Fichte’s	   practical	   philosophy.	   According	   to	   Darwall,	   Fichte’s	   conception	   of	   right,	  which	   is	   based	   on	   Fichte’s	   notion	   of	   a	   summons,	   offers	   a	   better	   starting	   point	   for	   a	  second-­‐personal,	   and	   thus	   contractualist	   theory	   of	   morality	   than	   Kant’s	   practical	  philosophy	  (Darwall	  2014).	  	  This	  paper	  defends	  Kant’s	  framework.	  Kant,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  presents	  a	  more	  compelling	  justification	   of	   a	   rightful	   condition	   than	   Fichte.	   Moreover,	   Kant’s	   account	   of	   the	  normative	   foundations	  of	   the	  principle	  of	   right	   is,	  as	   I	   try	   to	  show,	  best	  understood	   in	  terms	   of	   contractualism.	   An	   implicit	   appeal	   to	   contractualism	   seems	   also	   present	   in	  Kant’s	   ethical	   theory.	  Kant’s	   idea	  of	   a	  moral	   community	  as	   “a	   realm	  of	   ends”,	   that	   is	   a	  “systematic	   union	   of	   various	   rational	   beings	   through	   common	   objective	   laws”	   (Kant	  1996b,	  4:433,	  83)	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  giving	  rise	  to	  contractualism.	  My	  thesis	   is	  that	  such	   a	   Kantian	   form	   of	   contractualism	   provides	   a	   better	   foundation	   for	   a	   second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality	  than	  Fichte’s	  notion	  of	  a	  summons	  and	  conception	  of	  right.	  	  Against	   Darwall’s	   claim	   that	   contractualism	   relies	   on	   a	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	  morality,	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   contractualism	   that	   provides	   the	   foundations	   for	   a	   second-­‐personal	   standpoint	   in	   morality.	   Finally,	   I	   try	   to	   show	   that	   the	   proposed	   version	   of	  contractualism	  allows	  us	   to	   spell	  out	   the	   relations	  between	  second-­‐personal	  and	   first-­‐
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personal	  moral	  authority	   in	   the	  proper	  way.	  The	  account	  offered	  thus	  meets	  Darwall’s	  requirement	  that	  the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  includes	  first-­‐personal	  considerations.	  	  	  	  To	   avoid	   misunderstanding:	   The	   interpretation	   I	   propose	   amounts	   to	   a	   revisionary	  argument,	  suggesting	  that	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  morality,	  particularly	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  constitutive	  principles	  of	  a	  moral	  community,	  aligns	  with	  contemporary	  versions	  of	   contractualism.	   While	   a	   full	   elaboration	   and	   defense	   of	   Kantian	   contractualism	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  try	  to	  show	  that	  an	  agreement-­‐based	  reading	  of	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy	  offers	  the	  resources	  for	  current	  attempts	  to	  reconstruct	  morality	  as	  a	  relational	  enterprise,	  involving	  reciprocal	  claims	  and	  obligations.	  	  	  The	  paper	   is	   structured	   in	   the	   following	  way:	  After	   outlining	   (section	  2)	  why	  Darwall	  thinks	   that	   Fichte’s	   but	   not	   Kant’s	   account	   of	   right	   supports	   a	   second-­‐personal	  interpretation	  of	  morality,	  I	  argue	  (section	  3)	  that	  Darwall	  is	  mistaken	  in	  rejecting	  Kant’s	  conception	   of	   right.	   Section	   4	   points	   to	   problems	   in	   Fichte’s	   justification	   of	   a	   rightful	  condition,	  and	  section	  5	  tries	  to	  show	  that	  a	  contractualist	  reading	  of	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	   Kant’s	   practical	   philosophy	   provides	   the	   normative	   basis	   for	   Darwall’s	   second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality.	  	  	  
2.	  	  Darwall’s	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  and	  Fichte’s	  Concept	  of	  a	  Summons	  	  	  At	   the	   core	   of	   Darwall’s	   account	   of	   morality	   are	   four	   interrelated	   notions:	   claim,	  accountability,	   second-­‐personal	   reason,	   and	   second-­‐personal	   authority.	   The	   second-­‐person	   moral	   standpoint	   presupposes	   that	   free	   and	   rational	   agents	   have	   second-­‐personal	  authority,	  second-­‐personal	  competence,	  and	  an	  obligation	  of	  accountability	  to	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others	   (Darwall	   2006,	   74-­‐76).2	   The	   validity	   of	   claims	   addressed	   to	   another	   person	  depends	  upon	  whether	  one	  has	  the	   legitimate	  authority	  to	  hold	  the	  other	  accountable.	  Second-­‐personal	  relations	  give	  rise	  to	  second-­‐personal	  reasons	  that	  are	  agent-­‐relative.	  A	  form	  of	   reciprocal	   respect	   is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  all	   second-­‐personal	   reason-­‐giving.	  The	  accountability	  requirement	  is	  met	  by	  the	  “no-­‐reasonable-­‐rejection”	  test	  (Darwall	  2006,	  301).	  	  	  	  	  Darwall	   thinks	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   summons	   (Aufforderung)	   as	   it	   occurs	   in	   Fichte’s	  philosophy	  of	  right	  provides	  a	  model	  for	  explicating	  second-­‐personal	  moral	  interaction.	  A	  summons	   is	  a	  second-­‐personal	  claim	  that	  presupposes	  “a	  mutual	  second-­‐personality	  that	   addresser	   and	  addressee	   share	  and	   that	   is	   appropriately	   recognized	   reciprocally”	  (Darwall	  2006,	  21).	  A	  summons,	  Darwall	  argues,	  leads	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  oneself	  and	  the	  other	  as	  agents	  with	  equal	  normative	  standing.3	  He	  then	  follows	  Fichte’s	  suggestion	  that	  this	  requires	  that	  agents	  are	  to	  be	  connected	  by	  relations	  of	  right.	  	  	  The	  reason	  Darwall	  draws	  on	  Fichte’s	  philosophy	  of	  right	  and	  not	  on	  Fichte’s	  ethics,	  the	  
Sittenlehre,	   in	   order	   to	   explicate	   his	   second-­‐personal	   conception	   of	   morality	   is	   that	  Darwall	   interprets	   the	   second-­‐person	  moral	   standpoint	   as	   providing	   a	   foundation	   for	  contractualism.	   Principles	   of	   right,	   he	   argues,	   are	   crucial	   for	   contractualism:	   “It	   is	   a	  hallmark	  of	  contractualist	  theories	  that	  they	  hold	  principles	  of	  right	  to	  have	  a	  distinctive	  
role,	   namely,	   as	   mediating	   relations	   of	   mutual	   respect”	   (Darwall	   2006,	   301).	   And,	   he	  
                                                2	  For	  Darwall,	  second-­‐personal	  address	  is	  connected	  with	  reactive	  attitudes	  like	  resentment,	  blame,	  indignation,	  and	  guilt.	  He	  considers	  these	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  indicators	  of	  what	  can	  be	  rightfully	  demanded	  of	  others.	  They	  are	  the	  correct	  response	  if	  others	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  certain	  claims. 3	  For	  Darwall,	  the	  perspective	  of	  “unsummoned	  agency”	  amounts	  to	  a	  mere	  observer’s	  perspective.	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adds,	   contractualism	   “maintains	   that	   the	   form	   of	   principles	   of	   right	   is	   mutual	  accountability	  to	  one	  another	  as	  equal	  persons”	  (Darwall	  2006,	  301).	  	  Darwall’s	  paper	   in	  this	  volume	  (Darwall	  2014)	  further	   indicates	  his	  reliance	  on	  Fichte.	  He	   claims	   that,	   compared	  with	   Kant’s	   explication	   of	   right,	   Fichte	   offers	   “a	   potentially	  superior”	  account	  since,	  unlike	  Kant,	  Fichte	  emphasizes	   the	  second-­‐personal	  character	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  second-­‐personal	  authority	  on	  which	  they	  are	  based.	  More	  specifically,	  while	  Fichte	  associates	  a	  right	  with	  a	  summons	  and	  thus	  with	  a	  direct	  way	  of	  addressing	  another	  person,	  Kant	  defines	  a	  right	  as	  the	  authorization	  to	  use	  coercion.	  Thus	  a	  right	  for	  Kant	  allows	  one	  person	  to	  treat	  another	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  according	  to	  Darwall	  entirely	  different	   than	   being	   involved	   in	   a	   second-­‐personal	   normative	   relation	   to	   the	   other	  person.	  Moreover,	  he	   thinks	   that	   the	   relational	  obligation	   to	   the	  holder	  of	   the	   right	   to	  non-­‐interference	  is	  missing	  in	  Kant’s	  account.	  The	  person,	  addressed	  by	  the	  right	  holder,	  must	  respond	  directly	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  right	  holder;	  she	  must	  recognize	  that	  she	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  the	  right	  holder	  (Darwall	  2014,	  12).	  	  
3.	  Kant	  on	  Rights	  and	  Coercion	  	  How	  should	  we	  assess	  Darwall’s	  thesis	  that	  Fichte	  offers	  a	  more	  plausible	  explication	  of	  right	  than	  Kant?	  	  	  The	  similarity	  between	  Fichte’s	  Principle	  of	  Right	  and	  Kant’s	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  is	  obvious.	  Fichte’s	  principle	  reads:	  “I	  must	  in	  all	  cases	  recognize	  the	  free	  being	  outside	  me	  
as	  a	   free	  being,	   i.e.	   I	  must	   limit	  my	   freedom	   through	   the	   concept	  of	   the	  possibility	   of	   his	  
freedom”	   (Fichte	   2000,	   49,	   italics	   in	   the	   original).	   Kant’s	   Universal	   Principle	   of	   Right	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states:	  “Any	  action	  is	  right	  if	  it	  can	  coexist	  with	  everyone’s	  freedom	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	   law,	   or	   if	   on	   its	   maxim	   the	   freedom	   of	   choice	   of	   each	   can	   coexist	   with	  everyone’s	  freedom	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  law”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:230,	  387).	  Both	  principles	  are	  standards	  for	  regulating	  our	  relations	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  external	  freedom,	  relying	   on	   the	   same	   idea:	   equal	   freedom	   is	   constitutive	   for	   rightful	   relations.	   Equally	  close	  are	  some	  of	  Fichte’s	  and	  Kant’s	  explications	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   right.	  While	  Fichte	  holds	  that	  “the	  concept	  of	  right	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  necessary	  relation	  of	  free	  beings	  to	  one	  another”	  (Fichte	  2000,	  9),	  Kant	  describes	  right	  as	  “the	  sum	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  choice	  of	  one	  can	  be	  united	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  another	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  law	  of	  freedom”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:230,	  387).	  	  	  These	   similarities	   notwithstanding,	   Darwall	   dismisses	   Kant’s	   notion	   of	   a	   right.	   As	  indicated,	  his	  objection	  is	  that	  Kant’s	  definition	  of	  a	  right	  in	  terms	  of	  authorized	  coercion	  legitimizes	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  other	  person	  but	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  second-­‐personal	  relation	  and	  “a	  relational	  obligation	  to	  the	  right-­‐holder	  that	  is	  entailed	  by	  and	  correlative	  to	  the	  claim	  right	  he	  holds”	  (Darwall	  2014,	  12).	  	  	  I	  think	  that	  Darwall’s	  critique	  rests	  on	  a	  misunderstanding.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Kant	  associates	  the	  concept	  of	   right	  with	   “an	  authorization	   to	  use	  coercion”	   (Kant	  1996a,	  6:231,	  388).	  Darwall	  assumes	   that	   this	  authority	  plays	  out	  directly	   in	   the	   interaction	  of	  agents	  and	  thus	  amounts	  to	  the	  right	  of	  one	  agent	  to	  coerce	  another.	  However,	  Kant’s	  definition	  of	  a	  right,	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Right,	  is	  not	  meant	  in	  that	  sense.	  Later	  chapters	  in	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Right	  make	  clear	  that	  Kant	  attributes	  the	  authority	  to	  use	   coercion	   to	   the	   state.	   The	   right	   to	   hinder	   a	   hindrance	   to	   freedom	   is	   the	   state’s	  prerogative.	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  As	  his	  discussion	  of	  property	  shows,	  Kant	  distinguishes	  carefully	  between	  a	  provisional	  possession	  of	  an	  object	  and	  a	  right	   to	  the	  possession	  of	  an	  object.	  An	  initial	  or	  original	  acquisition	   of	   an	   object	   is	   simply	   a	   claim	   on	   an	   external	   thing	   as	   one’s	   own,	   thus	  amounting	  to	  a	  “provisional	  possession”	  of	  external	  objects.	  Kant	  notes	  that	  we	  have	  to	  leave	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  (where	  we	  have	  provisional	  possession	  of	  objects)	  and	  consent	  to	   “a	   rightful	   condition”	  of	  public	   justice	   that	  guarantees	  and	  protects	  property	   rights.	  Only	  in	  a	  state	  of	  “externally	  lawless	  freedom”	  would	  an	  individual	  be	  “authorized	  to	  use	  coercion	   against	   someone	   who	   already,	   by	   his	   nature,	   threatens	   him	   with	   coercion”	  (Kant	   1996a,	   6:307,	   452).	   Kant	   claims	   that	   such	   a	   condition	   of	   “externally	   lawless	  freedom”	  has	  to	  be	  overcome	  since	  it	  is	  “a	  condition	  that	  is	  not	  rightful,	  that	  is,	  in	  which	  no	  one	  is	  assured	  of	  what	  is	  his	  against	  violence”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:307,	  452).4	  	  	  According	   to	  Kant,	   the	   transition	   to	  a	   rightful	   condition	   requires	  a	   state	  based	  upon	  a	  constitution	   all	   citizens	   could	   accept,	   since	   it	   secures	   their	   rights:	   “Public	   right	   is	  
therefore	   a	   system	   of	   laws	   for	   a	   people,	   that	   is,	   a	   multitude	   of	   human	   beings,	   or	   for	   a	  
multitude	   of	   peoples,	   which,	   because	   they	   affect	   one	   another,	   need	   a	   rightful	   condition	  
under	  a	  will	  uniting	  them,	  a	  constitution	  (constitutio),	  so	  that	  they	  may	  enjoy	  what	  is	  laid	  down	  as	  right”	   (Kant	  1996a,	  6:311,	  455).	  Human	  beings	   thus	  need	  a	  system	  of	   “public	  coercive	   laws”,	   since	   in	   a	   rightful	   condition	   individuals	   do	   not	   have	   authority	   to	   use	  coercion	   themselves.	   	  Rather,	   they	  require	   the	  proper	  public	   institutions	   for	  executing	  coercion.	  	  	  
                                                4	  As	  Kant	  writes:	  “A	  rightful	  condition	  is	  that	  relation	  of	  human	  beings	  among	  one	  another	  that	  contains	  the	  condition	  under	  which	  alone	  everyone	  is	  able	  to	  enjoy	  his	  rights,	  and	  the	  formal	  condition	  under	  which	  this	  is	  possible	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  will	  giving	  laws	  for	  everyone’	  is	  called	  public	  justice”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:306,	  450). 
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One	   has	   to	   be	   careful	   here:	   Although	   Kant	   claims	   that	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  normative	   principle	   of	   equality	   each	   individual	   “member	   of	   a	   commonwealth”	   has	  “coercive	  rights	  against	  every	  other”	  no	   individual	  has	   the	  right	   to	   turn	   that	   right	   into	  action	   since	   it	   is	   “the	   head	   of	   state,	   by	   whom	   alone	   any	   rightful	   coercion	   can	   be	  exercised”	  (Kant	  1996c,	  8:291,	  292)5.	  Kant	  attributes	  to	  citizens	  the	  normative	  status	  of	  holding	   coercive	   rights,	   but	   he	  does	  not	   grant	   them	   the	   right	   to	   execute	   that	   coercive	  authority	  by	  themselves.	  This	  would	  represent	  a	  fall	  back	  into	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  state	  of	  nature.	  Thus	  individuals	  will	  consent	  to	  transferring	  their	  coercive	  authority	  to	  the	  state.	  The	   insight	   that	   they	  would	   otherwise	   face	   a	   condition	   of	   “external	   lawless	   freedom”	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  In	   Kant’s	   framework,	   the	  move	   to	   a	   civil	   and	   rightful	   condition	   is	   justified	   since	   each	  member	  of	  the	  society	  would,	  if	  rational,	  consent	  to	  the	  normative	  principles	  of	  “lawful	  freedom”.	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  a	  rightful	  condition	  is	  tied	  to	  “the	  idea	  of	  a	  will	  giving	  laws	  for	   everyone”	   indicates	   that	   individuals	   share	   the	   normative	   ground	   for	   obtaining	   a	  condition	  of	  public	   justice	   in	  which	   “everyone	   is	  able	   to	  enjoy	  his	   rights”	   (Kant	  1996a,	  6:306,	  450).	  Kant	   thus	   seeks	   to	  outline	   the	  public	  normative	   conditions	   that	   allow	   for	  rightful	   interpersonal	   relations.	   Nothing	   rules	   out	   that	   those	   relations	   cover	   second-­‐personal	   ground.	  Kant	  himself,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	  points	  out	   that	  human	  beings	  need	  a	  rightful	  condition	  since	  their	  actions	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  others.	  Rightful	  relations	  require	  respecting	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  and	  include,	  hence,	  the	  duty	  of	  accountability.	  Darwall’s	  critique	  of	  Kant’s	  definition	  of	  a	  right	  is	  therefore	  not	  justified.	  
                                                5	  Compare	  also	  the	  following	  passage:	  “But	  in	  terms	  of	  right	  (which,	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  general	  will,	  can	  be	  only	  one	  and	  which	  concerns	  the	  form	  of	  what	  is	  laid	  down	  as	  right	  not	  the	  matter	  or	  the	  object	  in	  which	  I	  have	  a	  right),	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  all	  equal	  to	  one	  another	  as	  subjects;	  for,	  no	  one	  of	  them	  can	  coerce	  any	  other	  except	  through	  public	  law	  (and	  its	  executor,	  the	  head	  of	  state),	  through	  which	  every	  other	  also	  resists	  him	  in	  like	  measure”	  (Kant	  1996c,	  8:292,	  292). 
  
9	  
	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Kant’s	  assumptions	  are	  decisive	  for	  Darwall’s	  own	  project.	  A	  second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality	  implicitly	  presupposes	  a	  normative	  framework	  such	  as	  the	  one	   Kant	   has	   in	   mind	   when	   talking	   about	   a	   ‘rightful	   condition’.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	  Darwall	  takes	  Fichte’s	  notion	  of	  a	  summons	  as	  a	  model	  for	  explicating	  a	  second-­‐personal	  way	   of	   addressing	   another.	   However,	   in	   order	   for	   a	   summons	   to	   be	   constitutive	   of	   a	  second-­‐person	   moral	   standpoint,	   it	   cannot	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   kind	   of	   demand	   or	  command—a	  point	  on	  which	  Darwall	  agrees.	  Recall	  that	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  agents	  must	  have	   the	  de	   jure	  authority	   to	  make	   claims	   on	   another	   person’s	   conduct.	  Without	   such	  implicit	   normative	   assumptions,	   a	   ‘summons’	   might	   represent	   a	  morally	   inacceptable	  mode	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  other	  individual.	  	  	  In	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint,	  Darwall	  discusses	  the	  case	  of	  a	  slaveholder	  addressing	  his	   slave	   (Darwall	   2006,	   267).6	  He	   concedes	   that	   a	   slaveholder’s	   demand	  on	  his	   slave	  might	  just	  be	  abusive	  talk.	  While	  the	  slaveholder	  has	  authority	  over	  the	  slave,	  we	  would	  certainly	  deny	  that	  he	  has	  legitimate	  authority	  to	  address	  the	  slave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reduces	  him	   to	   a	  mere	   recipient	   of	   orders.7	   Given	   the	   power	   relations	   the	   slave	   faces,	   he	   has	  reason	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  slaveholder.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  normative	  second-­‐personal	  reason	  Darwall	  has	  in	  mind,	  indicating	  that	  not	  any	  mere	  summons	  to	  




another	   person	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   a	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	   morality.	   Only	   a	  summons	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  second-­‐personal	  address	  to	  an	  equal	  gives	  rise	  to	  second-­‐personal	  moral	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  Still,	  the	  question	  remains	  as	  to	  whether	  Fichte’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  summons	  does	   not	   capture	   more	   profoundly	   than	   Kant’s	   theory	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   second-­‐personal	   ways	   of	   addressing	   each	   other	   as	   equals.	   Let	   us	   thus	   take	   a	   closer	   look	   at	  Fichte’s	  argument.	  	  
4.	  	  Fichte’s	  Conception	  of	  Right	  	  	  In	  Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Right	  (2000),	  Fichte	  attempts	  to	  derive	  the	  concept	  of	  right	  by	  demonstrating	  its	  indispensability	  to	  free	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  agency.	  His	  idea	  is	  that	  an	  individual	   “cannot	   posit	   itself	   as	   a	   rational	   being	   with	   self-­‐consciousness	   without	  positing	   itself	  as	  an	   individual,	  as	  one	  among	  several	  rational	  beings	  that	   it	  assumes	  to	  exist	  outside	   itself,	   just	  as	   it	   takes	   itself	   to	  exist”	   (Fichte	  2000,	  9).	  According	   to	  Fichte,	  self-­‐consciousness	   involves	   not	   only	   the	   subject’s	   awareness	   of	   herself	   as	   unifying	  representational	   states,	   but	   also	   the	   subject’s	   practical	   perspective	   on	   herself	   as	   a	  rational	   and	   free	  being.	  Thus	   free	   and	   rational	   agency	   requires	   an	   external	   domain	  of	  freedom	  that	   is	  regulated	  by	  the	  Principle	  of	  Right.	  Hence,	   for	  Fichte,	  rights	  amount	  to	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  self-­‐consciousness.	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Fichte’s	  deduction	  of	   the	  conception	  of	  right	  proceeds	   in	  three	  steps	  based	  upon	  three	  theorems.8	   The	   first	   is	   that	   a	   subject	   with	   self-­‐consciousness	   ascribes	   to	   itself	   free	  efficacy—i.e.,	  the	  capacity	  to	  form	  ends	  and	  express	  its	  will	  in	  the	  world	  of	  objects.	  The	  second	  step	  is	  that	  a	  subject	  can	  only	  see	  itself	  as	  having	  efficacy	  if	  it	  sees	  others	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  subject	  becomes	  aware	  of	  its	  agency	  via	  the	  agency	  of	  others,	  or	  more	  specifically,	  via	  the	  summons	  of	  another	  agent	  which	  is	  a	  call	  upon	  the	  subject	  “to	  resolve	  to	  exercise	  its	  efficacy”	  (Fichte	  2000,	  31).	  “[O]ne	  is	  driven,”	  Fichte	  claims	  in	  the	   first	   corollary	   to	   this	   second	   theorem,	   “from	   the	   thought	   of	   an	   individual	   human	  being	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  second	  one,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  first”	  (Fichte	  2000,	  38).	  The	   final	   step	  of	   the	  deduction	  of	   the	   concept	  of	   right	   is	   that	   assuming	   the	  existence	   of	   other	   rational	   beings	   involves	   standing	   in	   a	   particular	   relation	   to	   them,	  namely	   “a	   relation	   of	   right	   (Rechtsverhältniß)”	   (Fichte	   2000,	   39).	   This	   entails,	   Fichte	  maintains,	  that	  “I	  must	  in	  all	  cases	  recognize	  the	  free	  being	  outside	  me	  as	  a	  free	  being,	  i.e.	  I	  
must	  limit	  my	  freedom	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  freedom”	  (Fichte	  2000,	  49).	  	  	  	  	  	  Commentators	   have	   noted	   that	   Fichte’s	   deduction	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	   Right	   seems	  problematic.	  The	  worry	  is	  that	  it	  involves	  an	  illegitimate	  shift	  from	  a	  theoretical	  notion	  of	   self-­‐consciousness	   (the	   unification	   of	   object	   representations)	   to	   a	   practical	   form	   of	  self-­‐consciousness,	  namely	  the	  willing	  of	  a	  self-­‐determining	  agent	  (Neuhouser	  2000,	  xvi-­‐xvii).	  	  Indeed,	   the	  claim	  that	  rights	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  being	  conscious	  of	  one’s	  own	  self	   is	   hardly	   tenable.	   The	   thesis	   seems,	   if	   at	   all,	   only	   plausible	   with	   respect	   to	  
                                                8	  For	  a	  helpful	  and	  clear	  exposition	  of	  Fichte’s	  argument	  see	  Neuhouser	  (2000),	  xii-­‐xvii. 
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autonomous	  practical	  agency.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  free	  and	  rational	  agents,	  we	  need	  a	  political	  order	  guaranteeing	  our	  personal	  and	  political	  rights.	  	  	  Fichte	   agrees	   that	   individuals,	   if	   they	  want	   to	   enjoy	   their	   rights,	   should	   enter	   into	   “a	  community	  among	  free	  beings”.	  However,	  he	  offers	  only	  a	  hypothetical	  reason	  for	  doing	  so.	  Fichte	  believes	  it	  is	  “not	  possible	  to	  point	  to	  an	  absolute	  reason	  why	  someone	  should	  make	  the	  formula	  of	  right—limit	  your	  freedom	  so	  that	  the	  other	  alongside	  you	  can	  also	  be	   free—into	   a	   law	   of	   his	   own	   will	   and	   actions.”	   He	   therefore	   attributes	   mere	  “hypothetical	  validity”	  to	  the	  Principle	  of	  Right	  (Fichte	  2000,	  82).	  	  	  	  Darwall	   acknowledges	   that	   Fichte’s	   conditional	   justification	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	   Right	  poses	   a	   problem	   for	   his	   argument	   that	   Fichte	   provides	   a	  more	   convincing	   account	   of	  rights	   than	   Kant	   does.	   He	   therefore	   criticizes	   Fichte’s	   “voluntarism”	   by	   arguing	   that	  entering	  into	  a	  community	  of	  rightful	  relations	  with	  others	  should	  not	  be	  something	  an	  agent	  may	  or	  may	  not	   choose	  but	   rather	  a	  necessary	  normative	  precondition.	  Darwall	  points	  out	  that	  Fichte	  must	  presuppose	  that	  “[u]nless	  we	  assume	  that	  we	  each	  already	  have	  the	  normative	  standing	  to	  obligate	  ourselves	  through	  our	  reciprocal	  commitments,	  no	  reciprocal	  willing	  can	  yield	  any	  obligating	   law”	  (Darwall	  2014,	  18).	  Thus	   instead	  of	  voluntarism,	   Fichte	   should	   according	   to	   Darwall	   adopt	   a	   “presuppositional	  interpretation”	   of	   the	   connection	   between	   a	   summons	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   right.	   That	  means	   that	   Darwall	   considers	   a	   community	   of	   regulating	   external	   relations	   in	  accordance	  with	   rights	  granted	  by	   the	  principle	  of	  equal	   freedom	  as	   indispensable	   for	  making	  claims	  on	  others.	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In	  my	  view,	  Darwall’s	  concession	  that	  Fichte’s	  theory	  has	  to	  presuppose	  the	  normative	  framework	  of	  a	  ‘rightful	  condition’	  so	  that	  a	  summons	  represents	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  on	  another	  amounts	  to	  endorsing	  Kant’s	  thesis	  that	  a	  rightful	  condition	  of	  public	  justice	  is	  a	  	  precondition	   for	  having	   rights	   towards	  others.9	  The	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	   is	   for	  Kant	  constitutive	  of	  a	  normative	  order	  in	  which	  agents	  may	  enjoy	  their	  space	  of	  external	  freedom	  independently	  from	  arbitrary	  interventions	  by	  others.	  	  	  We	  can	  interpret	  Kant’s	  point	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  rightful	  demands	  on	  others	  must	  come	  with	  a	  normative	  justification	  backed	  by	  principles	  of	  public	  morality	  on	  which	  free	  and	  rational	   agents	   would	   agree	   since	   this	   grants	   them	   the	   normative	   status	   of	   being	  respected	   as	   free	   agents	   by	   others.	   An	   essential	   principle	   of	   public	   morality	   is	   the	  Principle	  of	  Universal	  Right,	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  “a	  system	  of	  laws”	  guaranteeing	  equal	  freedom	   for	   all.	   This	   reasoning	  provides	   the	   link	   between	  Kant’s	   account	   of	   a	   rightful	  condition	  and	  contractualism.	  Kant	  uses	  the	   idea	  of	  rational	  agreement	   for	  making	  the	  presupposition	  of	  a	  rightful	  condition	  normatively	  compelling.	  	  In	   what	   follows,	   I	   aim	   to	   show	   that	   we	   can	   interpret	   Kant’s	   practical	   philosophy	   as	  involving	   a	   form	   of	   contractualism,	   which	   provides	   a	   justification	   for	   principles	   of	  freedom	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   ethical	   principles	   on	   the	   other.	   My	   argument	   is	   that	  Darwall’s	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	   morality	   relies	   upon	   accepting	   such	   a	   Kantian	  version	  of	  contractualism.	  	  	  
                                                9	  One	  might	  object	  that	  Kant	  presupposes	  a	  natural	  right,	  namely	  the	  “innate	  right”	  of	  freedom.	  True,	  Kant	  claims	  that	  this	  “original	  right”	  to	  freedom	  belongs	  “to	  every	  man	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  humanity.”	  He	  adds,	  however,	  that	  this	  right	  holds	  only	  “insofar	  as	  it	  can	  coexist	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  every	  other	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  law”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:237,	  393).	  This	  indicates	  that	  one’s	  innate	  right	  to	  freedom	  presupposes	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  and	  thus	  a	  rightful	  condition	  of	  public	  justice. 
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5.	  Contractualism	  as	  a	  Basis	  for	  a	  Second-­‐Personal	  Account	  of	  Morality	  	  In	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	  The	   Second-­‐Person	   Standpoint,	   Darwall	   argues	   that	   his	   second-­‐personal	   account	   of	   morality	   provides	   a	   foundation	   for	   contractualism.	   Here	   Darwall	  relies	  on	  Kant,	  not	  on	  Fichte.	  He	  offers	  a	  reformulation	  of	  Kant’s	  central	  moral	  principles	  in	  terms	  of	  contractualism.	  	  While	  I	  largely	  agree	  with	  Darwall’s	  interpretation	  of	  Kant,	  I	  think	  his	  order	  of	  priority	  should	   be	   reversed:	   Instead	   of	   claiming	   that	   contractualism	   depends	   upon	   a	   second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality,	   I	  argue	  that	  contractualism	  provides	  the	  foundations	  not	  only	  for	  our	  second-­‐personal	  moral	  relations	  but	  also	  for	  first-­‐personal	  moral	  authority.	  	  	  The	   starting	   point	   for	   Darwall’s	   reading	   of	   Kant’s	   theory	   is	   the	   dignity	   of	   persons	   as	  expressed	  by	  the	  Formula	  of	  Humanity.	  This	  requires	  treating	  one	  another	  as	  ends	  and	  never	  merely	  as	  means.	  According	   to	  Darwall,	   the	  concept	  of	  dignity	  has	   to	  be	  spelled	  out	   in	   second-­‐personal	   terms,	   namely	   those	   of	   mutual	   accountability	   among	   equals.	  Dignity	   thus	   commits	   us	   to	   addressing	   others	   with	   second-­‐personal	   demands	   that	  cannot	   be	   reasonably	   rejected	   and	   to	  which	   free	   and	   rational	   agents	   hold	   themselves	  accountable.	  	  	  Darwall	  maintains	  that	  the	  condition	  of	  recognizing	  others’	  dignity	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  idea	  of	   a	   realm	   or	   kingdom	   of	   ends—that	   is,	   a	   community	   of	   rational	   beings	   united	   by	  common	   laws	   requiring	   us	   to	   treat	   one	   another	   as	   ends	   and	   never	  merely	   as	  means.	  Kant’s	  Formula	  of	  Universal	  Law	  (FUL)	  specifies	  for	  Darwall	  what	  this	  idea	  of	  a	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  entails	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  particular	  will	  and	  reasoning	  of	  the	  individual	  person.	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That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  equal	  recognition	  of	  others	  excludes	  regarding	  individuals	  as	  having	  special	  standing—	  an	  idea	  that’s	   fleshed	  out	  by	  asking	  whether	  one’s	  maxims	  could	  be	  thought	  or	  willed	  as	  universal	  laws.	  	  In	  short,	  Darwall’s	   interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	   framework	  can	  be	  expressed	  thus:	   take	   the	  Formula	  of	  Humanity	  (FH)	  as	  fundamental;	  interpret	  FH	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Formula	  of	  the	  Realm	  of	  Ends	  (FRE);	  and	  finally,	  interpret	  the	  Formula	  of	  Universal	  Law	  (FUL)	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  ends	  (Darwall	  2006,	  304-­‐309,	  esp.	  308).	  The	  “no-­‐reasonable-­‐rejection”	  test	  amounts	  to	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  universalization	  procedure	  of	   the	   FUL.	   	   In	   other	  words,	   to	   ask	  whether	  my	  maxim	   can	   be	   thought	   or	  willed	   as	   a	  universal	   law	   is	   equivalent	   to	   asking	  whether	   others	   cannot	   reasonably	   reject	   actions	  based	  on	  that	  maxim.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  attributing	  such	  a	  form	  of	  contractualism	  to	  Kant	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  blur	  the	  distinction	  between	  individual	  and	  public	  morality.	  To	  ask	  which	  principles	  no	  one	  could	   reasonably	   reject,	   or	   to	   whose	   universal	   acceptance	   everyone	   could	   rationally	  agree,	  leaves	  open	  whether	  we	  are	  referring	  to	  ethical	  principles	  or	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Equally,	   the	   question	   which	   claims	   of	   others	   we	   cannot	   reasonably	   reject	   does	   not	  specify	   whether	   we	   should	   assess	   those	   demands	   on	   ethical	   grounds	   or	   grounds	   of	  justice.	   This	   seems	   to	   conflict	  with	   the	   clear	   line	   Kant	   draws	   between	   the	   spheres	   of	  internal	  freedom	  (ethics)	  and	  external	  freedom	  (justice,	  law).	  	  I	  will	  now	  suggest	  a	  contractualist	  interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  guiding	  principles	  of	  practical	  philosophy	   that	   acknowledges	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   sphere	   of	   ethics	   and	   the	  sphere	  of	  right.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends,	  namely	  a	  community	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of	   rational	   agents	   who	   recognize	   one	   another	   as	   free	   and	   equal,	   is	   fundamental	   for	  Kant’s	  ethics	  and	  his	  philosophy	  of	  right.	  Such	  a	  community	  involves	  that	  all	  its	  members	  agree	  on	  its	  constitutive	  normative	  principles.	  I	  then	  try	  to	  show	  that	  Kant’s	  framework	  not	   only	   endorses	   a	   first-­‐personal	   moral	   standpoint	   but	   can	   also	   make	   room	   for	   a	  second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality.	  	  	  Kant’s	  clearest	  appeal	  to	  contractualism	  appears	  in	  his	  political	  philosophy.	  In	  his	  essay	  
On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  Kant	  argues	   that	  a	   rightful	  or	  civil	   condition	   that	  establishes	  a	  commonwealth	  preserving	  “the	  right	  of	  human	  beings	  under	  public	  coercive	  laws”	  rests	  on	  a	  social	  contract,	  namely	  “the	  general	  (united)	  will	  of	  the	  people”	  that	  “is	  called	  the	  
original	  contract”	  (Kant	  1996c,	  8:289	  290;	  8:295,	  295).	  The	  possible	  consent	  of	  citizens	  constitutes	   for	   Kant	   “the	   touchstone	   of	   any	   public	   law’s	   conformity	  with	   right”	   (Kant	  1996c,	  8:297,	  297).	  	  	  Kant’s	   ethical	   theory,	   however,	   seems	   far	   from	   contractualism.	   The	   point	   of	   Kant’s	  argument	   in	   the	  Groundwork	   is	   to	   reveal	   the	   principle	   of	   a	   good	  will	   by	   a	   conceptual	  analysis	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   duty.	   This	   analysis	   leads,	   as	   we	   know,	   to	   the	   Categorical	  Imperative.	   A	  morally	   good	   person	  makes	   the	   Categorical	   Imperative	   her	   principle	   of	  action	  by	  acting	  only	  on	  maxims	  that	  can	  be	  thought	  or	  willed	  as	  universal	  law.	  	  	  The	  incentive10	  of	  the	  action	  is	  decisive	  for	  the	  morality	  or	  immorality	  of	  the	  action.	  We	  act	  morally	  when	  we	   act	   from	   the	  motive	   of	   duty.	  Maxims	   as	   subjective	   principles	   of	  
                                                10	  In	  the	  Groundwork	  Kant	  defines	  an	  incentive	  (Triebfeder)	  as	  a	  subjective	  ground	  of	  motivation,	  based	  on	  desires	  and	  inclinations,	  while	  a	  motive	  (Bewegungsgrund)	  is	  an	  objective	  ground	  that	  motivates	  a	  rational	  will.	  In	  his	  later	  works,	  the	  term	  ‘incentive’	  has	  a	  broader	  meaning,	  covering	  empirical	  incentives	  and	  incentives	  of	  pure	  reason	  (Wood	  1999,	  111-­‐113,	  360-­‐361,	  note	  1).	  This	  paper	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘incentive’	  in	  the	  broader	  sense. 
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action	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  setting	  of	  ends.	  Directing	  one’s	  incentives	  and	  setting	  one’s	  ends	  is	  for	   Kant	   a	  matter	   of	   internal	   freedom;	   no	   person	   or	   institution	   has	   the	   right	   to	   force	  anyone	   else	   to	   adopt	   specific	   ends.	   Kant’s	   ethics	   thus	   seems	   restricted	   to	   inner	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   self-­‐legislation	   by	   the	   Categorical	   Imperative.	   This,	   one	   might	   object,	  commits	   us	   to	   a	   first-­‐person	   moral	   standpoint	   incompatible	   with	   a	   contractualist	  account	   of	   morality.	   The	   upshot	   of	   this	   line	   of	   criticism	   is	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   mutual	  agreement	   on	   principles	   does	   not	   capture	   Kant’s	   focus	   on	   internal	   incentives	   and	  maxims	  by	  assessing	  their	  moral	  quality.	  	  	  The	  situation	  is	  different	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  external	  freedom.	  	  Here	  what	  is	  crucial	  for	  Kant	  is	   that	   people	   follow	   the	   Principle	   of	   Right	   that	   obligates	   them	   to	   respect	   the	   equal	  external	  freedom	  of	  others.	  Kant	  considers	  the	  motivational	  reasons	  why	  persons	  do	  so	  to	   be	   irrelevant.	  Mere	   compliance	   is	  morally	   sufficient.11	   Since	   the	   sphere	   of	   external	  freedom	  does	  not	  rely	  on	   the	   inner	   incentives	  and	  motivations	  of	   the	  person,	   it	   seems	  compatible	  with	  contractualism.	  	  	  	  How	  should	  we	  cope	  with	  that	  dividing	  line	  between	  Kant’s	  ethics	  and	  his	  philosophy	  of	  right?	  Does	  it	  entail	  the	  two	  spheres	  of	  Kant’s	  practical	  philosophy	  to	  exist	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  and	  track	  different	  theories	  of	  morality?	  	  	  There	   is	   similarity	   between	   Kant’s	   formulation	   of	   the	   Categorical	   Imperative	   in	   the	  
Groundwork	  (namely	  to	  act	  only	  according	  to	  maxims	  which	  can	  be	  willed	  as	  universal	  
                                                11	  Kant	  famously	  expressed	  this	  distinction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  freedom	  thus:	  “All	  lawgiving	  can	  therefore	  be	  distinguished	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  incentive	  […].	  That	  lawgiving	  which	  makes	  an	  action	  a	  duty	  and	  also	  makes	  this	  duty	  the	  incentive	  is	  ethical.	  But	  that	  lawgiving	  which	  does	  not	  include	  the	  incentive	  of	  duty	  in	  the	  law	  and	  so	  admits	  an	  incentive	  other	  than	  the	  idea	  of	  duty	  itself	  is	  juridical	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:219,	  383).	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law)	  and	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right,	  which	  requires	  that	  actions	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	   freedom	   of	   others	   “in	   accordance	  with	   a	   universal	   law”.	   But	   the	   exact	   connection	  remains	  unclear.	  	  Actually,	  there	  seems	  no	  way	  to	  proceed	  directly	  from	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  in	  the	  
Groundwork	  to	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right.	  The	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  cannot	  be	   derived	   from	   the	   Categorical	   Imperative	   since	   the	   latter	   is	   tied	   to	   the	  motives	   and	  ends	  of	   the	  person,	  whereas	   the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	   completely	   ignores	   those	  internal	   elements.	   Some	   philosophers	   have	   thus	   concluded	   that	   Kant’s	   philosophy	   of	  right	   does	   not	   fit	   into	   the	   structure	   of	   Kant’s	  moral	   philosophy.12	   Kant’s	   own	   project	  notwithstanding,	  the	  Groundwork	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  My	   suggestion	   is	   that	   Kant’s	   idea	   of	   a	   realm	   of	   ends,	   as	   he	   introduces	   it	   in	   the	  
Groundwork,	   provides	   the	   unifying	   principle	   for	   his	   practical	   philosophy.	   It	   should	   be	  seen	   as	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   his	   practical	   philosophy,	   covering	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	  Kant’s	   ethics	   and	   his	   philosophy	   of	   right.13	   A	   consequence	   of	   this	   view	   is	   that	  contractualism	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  Kant’s	  ethics	  and	  his	  philosophy	  of	  right.	  	  	  	  
                                                12	  One	  proponent	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  independence	  thesis	  is	  Willaschek	  (1997)	  and	  (2009).	  Guyer	  (2009)	  defends	  the	  unity	  of	  Kant’s	  practical	  philosophy.	  Ripstein	  (2009,	  Appendix)	  tries	  to	  explain	  the	  connection	  between	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  of	  right	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  by	  appealing	  to	  Kant’s	  arguments	  about	  concepts	  and	  objects	  in	  the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  why	  and	  in	  what	  respect	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  has	  to	  be	  different	  from	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative. 13	  This	  interpretation	  differs	  somewhat	  from	  Kant’s	  own	  exposition	  in	  the	  Groundwork.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  it	  incompatible	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  Kant’s	  ideas.	  At	  first	  glance,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  realm	  of	  ends	  is	  central	  to	  Kant’s	  practical	  philosophy	  seems	  to	  conflict	  with	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  the	  Formula	  of	  the	  Realm	  of	  Ends	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  synthesis	  of	  the	  Formula	  of	  Humanity	  and	  the	  Formula	  of	  Universal	  Law.	  However,	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  should	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  respects	  our	  being	  free	  and	  rational	  agents,	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends	  requires,	  captures	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Formula	  of	  Humanity;	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Universal	  Law	  Formula	  is	  fleshed	  out,	  in	  my	  interpretation,	  by	  asking	  which	  common	  principles	  and	  laws	  can	  be	  universalized—i.e.,	  cannot	  be	  reasonably	  rejected	  by	  all	  free	  and	  rational	  agents.	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Kant	  formulates	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends	  thus:	  “[A]ll	  rational	  beings	  stand	  under	  the	  
law	  that	  each	  of	  them	  is	  to	  treat	  himself	  and	  all	  others	  never	  merely	  as	  means	  but	  always	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves.	  But	  from	  this	  there	  arises	  a	  systematic	  union	  of	  rational	   beings	   through	   common	   objective	   laws	   […]	   [W]hat	   these	   laws	   have	   as	   their	  purpose	   is	   just	   the	   relation	   of	   these	   beings	   to	   one	   another	   as	   ends	   and	  means”	   (Kant	  1996b,	  4:433,	  83).	  He	  then	  adds:	  “A	  rational	  being	  belongs	  as	  a	  member	  to	  the	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  when	  he	  gives	  universal	  laws	  in	  it	  but	  is	  also	  himself	  subject	  to	  these	  laws”	  (Kant	  1996b,	  4:433,	  83).	  	  What	   justifies	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   realm	   of	   ends,	   that	   “systematic	   union	   of	   rational	   beings	  through	  common	  objective	  laws”?	  One	  might	  claim	  that	  those	  common	  laws	  constituting	  a	  “systematic	  union	  of	  rational	  beings”	  are	  dictated	  by	  pure	  practical	  reason.	  However,	  one	  might	  also	  interpret	  them	  as	  being	  based	  upon	  an	  agreement.	  	  	  We	  are	  brought	  directly	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  realm	  or	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  by	  seeking	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  On	  what	  fundamental	  principles	  must	  our	  relations	  to	  each	  other	  be	  based	  so	  that	  all	  of	  us,	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  agents,	  have	  reason	  to	  consent	  to	  them?14	  We	  would	  all	  give	  ourselves	  those	  common	  laws	  and	  choose	  to	  live	  by	  them	  since	  this	  guarantees	  our	  equal	   standing	  and	   freedom.	   It	   seems	  reasonable,	   from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  all,	   to	  accept	  them;	   we	   cannot	   reasonably	   reject	   them.	   This	   way	   we	   are	   a	   moral	   community,	  entertaining	  relations	  of	  dignity	  to	  each	  other.	  	  
                                                14	  Even	  Christine	  Korsgaard,	  who	  defends	  a	  first-­‐personal	  conception	  of	  morality,	  speaks	  the	  language	  of	  contractualism	  when	  she	  explains	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends	  in	  The	  Sources	  of	  Normativity	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  “The	  moral	  law,	  in	  the	  Kantian	  system,	  is	  the	  law	  of	  what	  Kant	  calls	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Ends,	  the	  republic	  of	  all	  rational	  beings.	  The	  moral	  law	  tells	  us	  to	  act	  only	  on	  maxims	  that	  all	  rational	  beings	  could	  agree	  to	  act	  on	  together	  in	  a	  workable	  cooperative	  system”	  (Korsgaard	  1996,	  99). 
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The	  obvious	  next	  step	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  general	  idea	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends	  is	  spelled	  out	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  internal	  freedom	  by	  the	  ethical	  Categorical	  Imperative	  and	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	   external	   freedom	   by	   the	   Universal	   Principle	   of	   Right.	   The	   Categorical	   Imperative	  secures	  my	  autonomy	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  inner	  motivations	  and	  convictions;	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  warrants	  my	   independence	   from	   the	  choice	  of	  others,	   thus	  enabling	  me	  to	  be	  my	  own	  master	  in	  external	  relations	  to	  others.	  	  Kant’s	   practical	   philosophy	   aims	   to	   answer	   two	   crucial	   questions,	   i.e.	   with	   regard	   to	  ethics:	  ‘What	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  good	  action?’	  and,	  as	  concerns	  the	  sphere	  of	  right:	  ‘What	  justifies	   coercion?’	   In	   answering	   those	   questions,	   Kant	   offers	   us	   two	   regressive	  arguments.	   In	   the	   Groundwork,	   the	   regressive	   argument	   leads	   to	   the	   Universal	   Law	  formulation	  of	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative.	  Kant	  reasons	  that	  a	  free	  or	  autonomous	  will	  acts	  according	  to	  its	  own	  principle	  or	  norm,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  self-­‐given	  law.	  The	  principle	  of	  a	  free	  will	  is	  henceforth	  a	  law,	  and	  the	  condition	  of	  being	  a	  law,	  namely	  holding	   universally,	   is	   exactly	   fulfilled	   by	   the	   Categorical	   Imperative	   in	   the	   Universal	  Law	  formulation.	  	  The	  regressive	  argument	   in	   the	  philosophy	  of	  right	   is	  based	  upon	  the	  assumption	  that	  coercion	   is	   justified	   when	   it	   prevents	   an	   action	   that	   would	   violate	   the	   condition	   of	  universal	  freedom.	  As	  Kant	  puts	  it:	  “[I]f	  a	  certain	  use	  of	  freedom	  is	  itself	  a	  hindrance	  to	  freedom	  in	  accordance	  with	  universal	  laws	  (i.e.,	  wrong),	  coercion	  that	  is	  opposed	  to	  this	  (as	  a	  hindering	  of	  a	  hindrance	  to	  freedom)	  is	  consistent	  with	  freedom	  in	  accordance	  with	  universal	  laws,	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  right”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:231,	  388).	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Kant’s	   point	   is	   that	   enforceable	   constraints	   on	   behavior	   should	   be	   set	   by	   universal	  external	  laws	  consistent	  with	  everyone’s	  freedom.	  This	  then	  grants	  the	  authority	  to	  use	  coercion.	  Crucially,	   this	  authorization	  amounts	  to	  a	  general	  regulation	  acceptable	   from	  all	   individual	   standpoints.	   Kant	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   use	   of	   coercion	   is	   not	   vindicated	  because	   of	   the	   unlawfulness	   of	   a	   particular	   act.	   The	   right	   to	   use	   coercion	   is	   for	   Kant	  neither	  directed	  at	  the	  inner	  determination	  of	  a	  perpetrator	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  external	  law,	   nor	   is	   it	   based	   upon	   the	   “unlawful	   use	   of	   freedom”	   by	   a	   perpetrator’s	   particular	  criminal	   act.	   Rather	   coercion	   is	   warranted	   by	   universal	   external	   laws	   –	   and	   this	  universality	  includes	  the	  coexistence	  of	  one’s	  freedom	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  perpetrators,	  as	  Kant’s	  remarks	  make	  clear:	  “Thus	  when	  it	  is	  said	  that	  a	  creditor	  has	  a	  right	  to	  require	  his	  debtor	   to	  pay	  his	  debt,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  he	   can	   remind	   the	  debtor	   that	  his	  reason	   itself	   puts	   him	   under	   an	   obligation	   to	   perform	   this;	   it	   means,	   instead,	   that	  coercion	  which	   constrains	   everyone	   to	   pay	   his	   debts	   can	   coexist	  with	   the	   freedom	   of	  everyone,	  including	  that	  of	  debtors,	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  external	  law”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:232,	  389).	  	  The	   idea	   of	   a	   realm	   of	   ends	   and	   the	   Universal	   Law	   formulation	   of	   the	   Categorical	  Imperative	  and	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  are	  connected	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  first,	  there	   is	   the	  contractual	  agreement	  of	  all	  subjects	   to	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends,	  which	  includes	  the	  commitment	  to	  see	  oneself	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  community	  of	  free	  and	  equal	  cooperative	   subjects.	   The	   regressive	   arguments	   show	  why	   the	   principle	   of	   ethics,	   the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  in	  the	  Universal	  Law	  formulation,	  and	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  philosophy	   of	   right	   (i.e.,	   the	   Universal	   Principle	   of	   Right)	   can	   be	   considered	   as	  implementing	   the	   idea	  of	   a	   realm	  of	  ends	   in	   the	   spheres	  of	  both	   internal	  and	  external	  freedom.	   I	   treat	   others	   as	   ends	   and	   not	  merely	   as	  means	   if	   I	   ask	  myself	  whether	  my	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maxims	  for	  acting	  can	  be	  thought	  or	  willed	  as	  universal	  law.	  As	  indicated,	  this	  means	  to	  ask	  whether	  others	  can	  reasonably	  consent	  to	  my	  maxim.	  I	  also	  treat	  others	  as	  ends,	  and	  not	  merely	  as	  means,	   if	   I	  consent	  to	  live	  in	  cooperative	  relations	  with	  others	  regulated	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  freedom.15	  	  On	   this	   interpretation,	   the	   regressive	   arguments	   do	   not	   simply	   lead	   to	   the	   ethical	  Categorical	   Imperative	   and	   the	   Principle	   of	   Universal	   Law—leaving	   the	   connection	  between	  ethics	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  right	  still	  open.	  Indeed,	  the	  regressive	  arguments	  provide	  a	  detailed	  account	  for	  why	  the	  ethical	  Categorical	  Imperative	  and	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  meet	  the	  requirements	  set	  by	  the	  general	  standard	  of	  a	  community	  of	  rational	  beings	  based	  on	  “common	  objective	  laws.”16	  	  	  	  Before	  proceeding	   to	  outline	   the	   consequences	  of	   this	   reading	  of	  Kant	  with	   respect	   to	  Darwall’s	  second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  morality,	  I	  want	  to	  address	  a	  possible	  objection:	  Is	  the	   step	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   realm	   of	   ends	   to	   the	   Universal	   Law	   formulation	   of	   the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  really	  plausible?	  In	  other	  words,	  does	  it	  not	  simply	  leave	  us	  again	  with	  the	  problem	  that	  any	  general	  principle	  that	  seeks	  to	  unite	  ethics	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  right	  ultimately	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  crucial	  point	  of	  ethics,	  namely	  the	  decisive	  role	  of	  
                                                15	  One	  might	  object	  that	  this	  interpretation	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  is	  “a	  postulate	  that	  is	  incapable	  of	  further	  proof”	  (Kant	  1996a,	  6:231,	  388).	  I	  think,	  however,	  that	  reconstructing	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  for	  consenting	  to	  the	  Universal	  Principle	  of	  Right	  is	  more	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Kant’s	  project.	  True	  enough,	  Kant	  is	  often	  close	  to	  rationalism,	  even	  a	  dogmatic	  form	  of	  rationalism.	  Yet	  his	  painstaking	  efforts	  in	  developing	  a	  regressive	  argument	  in	  the	  Groundwork	  show	  that	  Kant	  is	  not	  content	  with	  relying	  on	  mere	  a	  priori	  truth	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative.	  Guyer	  (2009,	  201-­‐217)	  argues	  that	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  a	  postulate	  is	  “incapable	  of	  further	  proof”	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  postulate	  needs	  no	  further	  justification. 16	  A	  possible	  criticism	  is	  that	  Kant	  does	  not	  leave	  room	  for	  principles	  of	  justice	  as	  standards	  of	  public	  morality,	  functioning	  as	  guidelines	  for	  the	  sphere	  of	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  design	  of	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  society.	  But	  such	  principles	  of	  justice	  could	  equally	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  question:	  Which	  form	  of	  society	  would	  free	  and	  rational	  agents	  who	  want	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  free	  and	  rational	  agents	  choose?	  Kant’s	  position	  can	  be	  interpreted	  to	  cover	  such	  principles	  of	  public	  morality. 
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the	   incentive	  of	  action	  and	  the	   inner	  determination	  of	   the	  person?	  Can	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  in	  ethics	  be	  considered	  an	  implementation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  ends?	  	  	  The	  problem	  is	  especially	  relevant	  given	  that	  the	  Formula	  of	  Universal	  Law	  is	  addressed	  to	   the	   individual	   herself	   and	   brings	   her	   will	   to	   the	   fore	   by	   requiring:	   “[A]ct	   only	   in	  
accordance	  with	  that	  maxim	  through	  which	  you	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  will	  that	  it	  become	  a	  
universal	   law”	   (Kant,	   1996b,	   4:421,	   73,	   italics	   in	   the	   original).	   Some	   philosophers,	  including	   Darwall,	   have	   therefore	   claimed	   that	   the	   Universal	   Law	   formulation	   of	   the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  makes	  no	  appeal	  to	  the	  standpoint	  of	  others	  and	  what	  they	  can	  reasonably	  accept	  or	  cannot	  reasonably	  reject	  (Darwall	  2006,	  307).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  contradiction	   in	   the	   case	  of	  non-­‐universalizable	   ethical	  maxims	  amounts	   to	  mere	   self-­‐contradiction	  of	  the	  inner	  self.17	  	  Such	   a	   narrow	   reading	   of	   the	   Universal	   Law	   Formula	   seems	   to	  me	   untenable.	   Closer	  examination	  reveals	  that	  the	  universalization	  test	  only	  works	  if	  one	  assumes	  that	  others	  act	   likewise.	  What	   the	   inner	   determination	   of	   one’s	  will	   amounts	   to	   is	   the	   acceptance	  that	  one’s	  will	  must	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  principle	  that	  could	  be	  thought	  or	  willed	  for	  others	  as	   well.	   I	   have	   to	   act	   in	   a	   way	   that	   my	   will,	   expressed	   in	   my	   maxims,	   be	   guided	   by	  principles	   to	   which	   others	   could	   consent.	  We	   have	   to	   read	   this	   “will”	   as	   my	   internal	  voice,	  but	  not	  as	  my	  solipsistic	  voice.	  The	  decisive	  element	  in	  the	  Formula	  of	  Universal	  Law	   is	   universality,	   and	   this	   includes	  making	  my	   inner	   resolutions	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  standpoint	  of	  others.	  Given	  its	  structure,	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  test	  requires	  me	  to	  
                                                17	  Ripstein	  (2009,	  385,	  386)	  defends	  such	  an	  interpretation.	  For	  him,	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  test	  “is	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐contradiction	  for	  which	  the	  agent	  must	  reproach	  him-­‐	  or	  herself	  in	  conscience”	  (Ripstein	  2009,	  377).	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consider	   the	   claims	   of	   others;	   its	   application	   trivially	   presupposes	   something	   like	  ‘second	  personal	  competence’.	  	  The	   worry	   about	   an	   unbridgeable	   gap	   between	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   realm	   of	   ends	   and	   the	  Formula	   of	   Universal	   Law	   thus	   seems	   unsubstantiated.	   Coherence	   in	   my	   normative	  commitments	   requires	   that	   I,	   who	   already	   agreed	   on	   the	   laws	   constitutive	   for	   the	  community	  of	  rational	  and	  equal	  beings,	  approve	  that	  my	  own	  will	  must	  also	  be	  guided	  by	   those	   laws.	   I	   address	   the	  general	  principle	   to	  myself.	  The	   incentive	  of	  my	  action	   is	  relevant	  since	   it	   is	   indispensable	  to	  my	  individual	  agency.	  Moreover,	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  my	   own	   moral	   action,	   the	   incentive	   must	   be	   of	   a	   particular	   kind:	   I	   simply	   cannot	  determine	  myself	  to	  act	  morally	  unless	  my	  incentive	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  moral	  principle.	  	  Individual	   agency	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   external	   relations	   likewise	   requires	   an	   incentive.	  However,	  here	  I	  can,	  though	  need	  not	  act	  morally.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  since	  the	  authority	  for	  regulating	  the	  sphere	  of	  external	  relations	  is	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  state.	  And	  the	  state	  may	  require,	   even	   force	   us	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   laws,	   but	   it	   may	   not	   require	   us	   to	   do	   so	  morally.	  	  Let	   us	   return	   to	   Darwall’s	   theory	   of	   morality.	   Darwall	   claims	   that	   the	   second-­‐person	  standpoint	  gives	  rise	  to	  contractualism.	  In	  outlining	  the	  connection	  between	  his	  second-­‐personal	  conception	  of	  morality	  and	  contractualism,	  he	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  principles	  of	   right.	   Recall	   his	   remark	   that	   principles	   of	   right	   constitute	   a	   “hallmark”	   of	  contractualism.	   This	   entails	   that	   Darwall’s	   account	   of	   morality	   merely	   captures	   our	  moral	  obligations	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  external	  freedom.	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But	  morality	  also	  includes	  norms	  that	  guide	  my	  moral	  relations	  to	  others	  in	  light	  of	  the	  principles	   to	   which	   I	   consented,	   given	   that	   general	   recognition	   of	   those	   principles	  secures	   my	   status	   as	   a	   free	   and	   rational	   agent.	   This	   is	   where	   first-­‐personal	   moral	  authority	  becomes	  relevant:	  I	  consent	  to	  live	  by	  the	  principles	  constituting	  a	  community	  of	   free	   and	   rational	   beings,	   given	   that	   this	   grants	   me	   the	   recognition	   and	   respect	   of	  others	  as	  a	  free	  and	  rational	  subject.	  But	  this	  initial	  agreement	  on	  the	  norms	  constituting	  such	   a	  moral	   community	   entails	   that	   I,	   deliberating	   from	   the	   first-­‐person	   standpoint,	  also	  assess	  my	  actions	  and	  obligations	  to	  others	  in	  light	  of	  those	  principles	  that	  speak	  to	  their	  standpoints.18	  Contractualism	  thus	  covers	  not	  only	   the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  but	  also	  shapes	  my	  first-­‐personal	  moral	  authority.	  	  	  	  Darwall	   cannot—and	   in	   fact	   does	   not—dispel	   a	   first-­‐person	   standpoint.	   An	   essential	  element	   in	   his	   moral	   theory	   is	   responsibility	   and	   accountability	   to	   others.	   However,	  Darwall	  himself	   emphasizes	   that	   this	   second-­‐personal	   aspect	  must	  have	  a	   first-­‐person	  counterpart.	  What	  he	  calls	  Pufendorf’s	  point	   is	   relevant	  here:	   If	  we,	  as	  members	  of	   the	  moral	   community,	   hold	   another	   person	   responsible	   for	   complying	   with	   a	   moral	  obligation,	   we	   take	   it	   that	   the	   person	   likewise	   holds	   herself	   responsible.	   In	   Darwall’s	  words:	  	   To	   intelligibly	   hold	   someone	   responsible,	   we	   must	   assume	   that	   she	   can	   hold	  herself	  responsible	  in	  her	  own	  reasoning	  and	  thought.	  And	  to	  do	  that,	  she	  must	  be	  able	   to	   take	   up	   a	   second-­‐person	   standpoint	   on	   herself	   and	   make	   and	  acknowledge	  demands	  of	  herself	  from	  that	  point	  of	  view	  (Darwall	  2006,	  23).	  	  




	  This	   entails	   that	   the	   person	   must	   rely	   on	   her	   own	   reasoning	   and	   judgment	   and	   not	  simply	  be	  driven	  by	  fear	  of	  sanctions	  from	  others.	  Just	  as	  Pufendorf	  claimed	  that	  moral	  obligations	   derive	   not	  merely	   from	   the	   external	   authority	   of	   God	   threatening	   us	  with	  sanctions	   (in	   case	  we	   violate	  moral	   obligations)	   but	   from	   our	   understanding	   of	   God’s	  demands,	  so	  too	  our	  commitment	  to	  moral	  obligations	  emerges	  from	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  demands,	  which	  we,	  as	  rational	  agents,	  address	  to	  ourselves.	  To	  take	  up	  a	  second-­‐person	   standpoint	   on	   oneself	   means	   to	   define	   one’s	   first-­‐personal	  moral	   authority	   in	  light	  of	  the	  principles	  constituting	  the	  moral	  community	  of	  free	  and	  rational	  agents.	  By	  confirming	   the	   importance	   of	   “free	   self-­‐determination”	   (Darwall	   2006,	   23),	   Darwall	  presupposes	  a	  kind	  of	  internalism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  individual	  subject:	  the	  agent	  herself	  acknowledges	  the	  force	  of	  obligations.	  	  	  Contractualism	   does	   not	   rule	   out	   such	   first-­‐personal	   considerations.	   Even	   if	   the	  normative	  force	  of	  the	  basic	  moral	  laws	  rests	  on	  a	  contractualist	  agreement	  with	  others,	  there	  must	  be	  corresponding	  first-­‐person	  recognition	  of	  that	  source	  of	  normativity.	  	  To	  conclude:	  I	  argued	  that	  contractualism	  offers	  a	  direct	  route	  to	  the	  normative	  idea	  of	  a	  community	   of	   equals	   constituted	   by	   principles	   that	   cannot	   be	   reasonably	   rejected.	  However,	   contractualism	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   specify	   that	   general	   idea	   in	   order	   to	  make	  room	  for	  the	  crucial	  distinction	  between	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  and	  rights,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	   ethics,	   on	   the	   other.	   Such	   a	   form	   of	   contractualism	   grounds	   Darwall’s	   second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  ethics	  but	  also	  covers	  the	  first-­‐personal	  standpoint.	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